OMFG, MMT & Positive Money Get Along

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{OMFG = Overt Monetary Financing of Government}

 

Introduction

 

Economies run on tokens from two balance sheet expansions:

  1. (The sum of) Banks’ balance sheet expansions, where bank loans create deposits (also called “horizontal” money)
  2. National, where the government spends into the economy expanding the national balance sheet (aka “vertical” money)

Two observations:

1) It is desirable, especially evident after 2008, to more carefully regulate the horizontal sector, which would also reduce its overall size significantly.

2) In the current economic climate it is desirable to expand the vertical balance sheet, both to maintain/increase aggregate demand and to foster activities that the public desires that increase the public’s well-being (infrastructure, education, healthcare etc.).

Note that although more carefully regulating the horizontal side would decrease aggregate demand (especially given the overheated credit impulse/acceleration Steve Keen has so usefully highlighted) this would be balanced by increasing the vertical side.

What do MMT economists and Positive Money propose regarding these two systems?

Both agree that the vertical side should be larger and the horizontal side more regulated with the resulting smaller horizontal component made up for by expanding the vertical side.

 

On The Vertical Side

The crucial fact about the vertical side is that the fact that a nation is not like a household is evident regardless of the operational details. Positive Money is wrong in their belief the current system must be changed to achieve the type of government spending they want.

However, this does not mean that Positive Money is flat out wrong. Key MMT people would be perfectly happy to spend vertically in the way Positive Money wants, which is just PQE/OMF by another name. This is especially so given that OMF procedures would be transparent and thus politically advantageous.

MMT scholars just do not believe it is remotely as urgent as Positive Money because they realize the current system is already capable of spending into the economy in the same way that PM wants to (Wray 2001, Fullwiler 2011 ). Also, many have rejected PM more or less out of hand because of Positive Money views or perceived views on the horizontal system [which we turn to below].

At any rate, regarding the vertical system – The crucial thing is to get the vertical system to do what is good for the economy – functional finance – regardless of the operational details.

From a political point of view it is better to have a clearer more straightforward system [PQE/OMF]. This is a substantially less fundamental problem, however, than what Positive Money thinks it is doing; in saying that, however, the practical and strategic importance of making the changes to a straightforward system perhaps should not be underestimated.

Scott Fullwiler himself has noted the fundamental agreement on vertical money issues:

“interestingly, understanding how DFM [Debt Free Money] works also illustrates the MMT view of government spending and government bond issuance. Logically we should expect that DFM supporters could join MMT in rejecting otherwise widespread concerns about government solvency, China refusing to purchase US national debt, the financial sustainability of entitlement programs, and so forth.” (Fullwiler 2014)

(relatedly and importantly, both Positive Money and many MMT economists propose ZIRP; another post for that though)

On The Horizontal Side 

As noted, MMT rejects Positive Money mainly because of PM views on the horizontal side – in the past PM stated they wanted to eliminate the horizontal altogether and essentially create a loanable funds system. Contrast this to MMT, for which overall pre-2007 regulating the horizontal side was not a primary focus (not to ignore the Minsky-Wray connection and other pre 2007 work of course, but banking regulation was/is not the overarching focus of MMT). [Update: please see Scott Fullwiler’s comments on pre-2007 bank regulation/MMT)

However, both sides have moved closer together on horizontal money, to the point where in practice the horizontal systems they advocate would be similar.

MMT increased the emphasis on limiting the horizontal after 2007 (Mosler 2009, Mitchell 2009, Mitchell  2010, Wilson 2017).   Crucially, the Mosler/Mitchell/Wilson proposals would be far more significant and profound in their effects than they are given credit forEasily enforced common sense rules (that did not exist in 2008) to force banks to hold the loans they make, operate on a single balance sheet, and not accept financial collateral already clears up most of the problems with banking and would leave a drastically shrunk but drastically more healthy horizontal money and funding system in place.

Simply put, this puts MMT closer to the goals of PM on horizontal money than is generally recognized.

Conversely Positive Money has moved to allow what is in effect horizontal money creation (whether “nationalized” or not makes little difference if regulated in the proposed ways). This pushes PM substantially towards the same horizontal system that would result were the Mosler/Mitchell/Wilson proposals to be put into practice.

(The similarity in views on this are evident in these quotes by MMT scholars and Positive Money:

“Right now, we have far more finance than we need. Exactly how much of it we could eliminate as unnecessary is up for debate. I wouldn’t be surprised if our economy would actually run better if finance was downsized by 90%”
L. Randall Wray 2014

“The correct approach, as highlighted by the MMT view, is to reduce bank lending by banning its use for anything that isn’t constructive. Bill Mitchell regularly suggests that 97% of financial transactions should be illegal.”
Neil Wilson 2014

“The central bank would be willing to create additional money, on demand, in response to banks that are able to lend that money to non-FIRE sector businesses. This protects the level of lending to businesses.”
Positive Money 2015)

 

Conclusion

There are two monetary systems, vertical and horizontal. Both MMT and Positive Money want to see the vertical increased in size to maintain aggregate demand and increase the general welfare; both MMT and Positive Money would like to see a more straightforward (PQE/OMF operations) vertical money system that would allow mainstream economists and the public to understand that a nation is not like a household (Positive Money makes the mistake of not realising that the current vertical system can already do what PM wants; MMT could perhaps make even clearer than they already do that the current system can do this without structural change).

Both MMT and Positive Money would like to shrink the horizontal system through reducing it to funding only real production. The two schools of thought come from utterly opposite directions on horizontal money; however in practice both of their suggested horizontal systems would be for all practical purposes the same – limiting banking to a completely safe payments system and to an investment-side that is regulated to only expand enough to fund productive investment but not to allow asset bubbles via a non productive FIRE sector. Whether the horizontal side is “nationalized” or not is merely a distraction – banks under the Mosler/Mitchell/Wilson rules providing for capital development based on solid credit analysis would operate the same regardless of their formal status vis-à-vis government. Positive Money is wrong to think this can be done in a loanable funds system (future post), but plain vanilla 1960s banking works fine.

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March 28, 2019  UPDATE: The Intro to Economics textbook is finished! Live on Amazon here –

1000 Castaways: Fundamentals of Economics

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Banking System We Need

As the crisis of 2007 demonstrated, the banking system in its current form does not optimally serve the public interest. To make the system work in the best interest of the nation as a whole, I would make the following changes:

Banks

  • Banks that are allowed to grant loans that create deposits would operate under the Mosler/Mitchell/Wilson proposals including:
  • Be allowed direct access to government funds  (details below)
  • All bank levies, liquidity ratios, and reserve requirements would be eliminated.
  • Banks must operate on a single balance sheet, and with no subsidiaries of any kind.
  • Banks should not be allowed to engage in profit making ventures beyond basic lending; banks should profit through high quality credit analysis.
  • Banks would be allowed to lend only directly to borrowers, and only for capital development purposes (i.e. business credit lines and household loans)
  • Loans must be kept on their books until cleared.
  • Banks cannot accept collateral.
  • Banks cannot buy (or sell) credit default insurance.
  • There would be a narrow banking option.

Treasury & Federal Reserve

All Federal Reserve functions would be absorbed by the Treasury. No public purpose is served by the Federal Reserve that cannot not be more democratically, efficiently, and transparently carried out by the Treasury.

Converting U.S. Government securities into federal reserves via open market operations serves no public purpose. The Treasury would fund the monetary system and public expenditure by spending zero interest perpetual bonds directly into the economy (electronically in the same manner currently used for transferring demand deposits and federal reserve accounts).

The same effect as above could be achieved by having the Federal Reserve keep the discount rate and fed funds rate target at zero and allow zero rate overdrafts by the Treasury on its deposit account. However, maintaining and allowing a Federal Reserve/Primary Dealer(s) middleman to do this serves no public purpose.

Having the Treasury spend zero interest perpetual bonds directly into the economy allows for funding full resource utilization (including mobilization/training for all idle labor). The public purpose is hindered by obfuscation from complex and needless Open Market/Primary Dealer operations. The national government maintains productivity and stable price levels through fiscal spending and taxation respectively and this should be done both directly and openly.

The fundamental structure/goals of the current FOMC will be maintained within the Treasury, with a primary mandate to maintain full productivity and a stable price level. As now, appointments to the body will outlast/overlap political and administrative terms of office, allowing the price stability mandate to remain apolitical in the manner of the current FOMC.

The role of banks and credit

The role of banks is to provide for a payments system and to fund loans based on credit analysis.

The payments system will be an open clearing system created by the state available to all on an open license. The public purpose is best served by a single public payment system.

A primary area of concern with a non-endogenous monetary system based on treasuries is that if banks are only allowed to loan funds they actually possess (in the way building societies/credit unions traditionally functioned) lending will not be sufficiently responsive to the needs of the economy. Credit is thought to be overly restricted and bank balance sheet expansion/contraction not able to nimbly adapt to prevailing economic conditions.

Crucially, the above concern over restricted credit demonstrates a failure to follow through with the full implications of a direct treasury funded system. Zero interest perpetual bonds, unlike current bank credit, will not be extinguished by loans being repaid. This is not trivial. Under this system the incentives and availability of funds for building society/S& L/credit union type institutions is vastly greater than the current system due to the way in which repayment does not extinguish money in the way it does in the current system.

The current system relies on distracting Federal Reserve/ Primary Dealer operations that maintains the destructive public belief in the “household analogy.” This is also perpetuated by the demand deposit money system. Neither of these processes serve the public and are easily bypassed.

“Endogenous” bank balance sheet expansion
In addition to building society/credit union type institutions, special banks will be allowed to grant loans that create treasury deposits, with the loaned treasuries extinguished on repayment.

These public/private partnerships are licensed to create and extinguish (as loans are repaid) zero interest perpetual Treasury bonds. They serve as intermediaries between the Treasury and businesses/individuals who are willing to take on what is in effect a special tax burden for a special privilege (treasury funding).

This process is the same as the current private endogenous demand deposit creation process which is able to nimbly expand and contract to meet changing economic conditions. However, crucially, it beneficially keeps the process on one national balance sheet. The creation of private demand-deposit money serves no public purpose that cannot be duplicated with direct-issued treasury money.

These transactions are carried out in the same way as bank credit money is created now, with the asset restrictions outlined in the “banks” section above (the Mosler/Mitchell/Wilson rules).

These special funding/taxation agreements are one more policy choice for spending into the economy, along with fiscal, tax reduction, and citizen dividend options. Crucially, the amount of spending via this channel can, unlike the current system, be easily made highly countercyclical via changes to capital requirements, loan quality assessment, and interest rates and is a policy decision like any other.

Summary: Stability, Equity, Innovation 

A monetary system is made by creating and expanding a balance sheet and the public operating within the asset side of it.
Taxes (or the bank equivalent, loans) represent a debt. This debt obligation is traded around as currency. This is why taxes (or bank debt repayment) give value to a currency.

  • It can be national, with government spending creating deposits and taxes destroying deposits. That is, the public swaps the government’s deposits (treasuries) around as money.
  • It can be endogenous, with bank loans creating deposits and repayment destroying deposits. The public swaps banks’ demand deposits around as money.
  • In the latter case when businesses/individuals choose to take out a loan beyond what the building society/credit union/mutual funds banks might provide, they in effect choose to take on greater spending and in return take on an additional tax burden (thus helping to maintain the value of the currency; taxes give value to a currency). For the good of the public and for innovation, individuals voluntarily asume a possible gain and asume a liability.
  • Both systems can exist at same time with same denomination, as in modern economies.
  • Both their combined total size and the balance between them is important…

Optimal total size and optimal balance 

  • Optimal level of total money creation = enough to keep the economy at full productivity, through both fiscal policy and through individuals having money created for them (loans) for spending on productive purposes.
  • Optimum balance is enough national spending to create public goods that otherwise wouldn’t be done – i.e., infrastructure, education, full use of idle resources including idle labor, military, and health care.
  • Additional spending into the economy for innovative, productive economic activity is by the special banks (endogenous) sector. This private borrowing/repaying allows private venture-type investment by individuals who agree to what is in effect voluntary taxation. This is also equitable because, unlike normal taxation, individuals ask for the additional opportunity (and accept voluntary “taxation” in return).  If credit analysis is administered in the right way, this means goods created by individuals who are willing to take on rewards but also take on an additional tax.
  • Both systems net to zero. This is crucial to emphasize in both systems, albeit for different reasons. In the government balance sheet expansion monetary system, it is important to realize that as a whole the system is debt free (assets and liabilities net to zero) as this highlights the fact that the government can expand the balance sheet as much as they want in order to bring all idle resources into productive use. Being clear on the equity, debt free nature of the national balance sheet crucially highlights the fact that the nation is not a household and is key to getting the public to realize that the government balance-sheet monetary system does not remotely function like a household.
  • On the endogenous side, although the private endogenous system nets to zero the total size of its balance sheet relative to the monetary system matters. If the endogenous balance sheet expands greatly due to unproductive debt creation for the FIRE sector (as now), although it nets to zero it nevertheless unfairly allows real claims on real resources.
  • The system balanced so that there is easy availability of the “endogenous” system to those who want to borrow/repay, but it is far more stable than the current system.
  • One national balance sheet reflects the reality of our intertwined monetary-financial system and allows easier optimization of public spending and productive investment.

[I am traveling at the moment & this is a rough draft that needs editing – comments greatly appreciated]

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March 28, 2019  UPDATE: The Intro to Economics textbook is finished! Live on Amazon here –

1000 Castaways: Fundamentals of Economics

Endogenous money, MMT, Positive Money, & financial reform

Among the Post-Keynesian groups concerned with understanding and fixing problems that lead to the 2007/8 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and other ongoing economic problems there are different areas of focus by circuit theorists, Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), Steve Keen’s approach to private debt, and other Post-Keynesians. (MMT, while often with a focus on other aspects of the economy [as L. Randall Wray writes, leading from neo-Chartalist and functional finance insights to fiscal policy] is nevertheless firmly grounded in endogenous money theory). Despite these various approaches having important disagreements and areas of interest all are grounded in reality & therefore their discussions on policy options are coherent and useful, unlike orthodox policy discussions.

There is another perhaps small but dedicated and often visible group of reformers that focus on the monetary system. Broadly these are the various groups that want to change the monetary system such as The American Monetary Institute (AMI), Positive Money (PM), economists associated with the New Chicago Plan and others. Their relation with the Post-Keynesian groups mentioned above is somewhat complicated, and the key reason involves endogenous money. Before continuing, it helps to divide these diverse money reforming groups into two broad categories:

I. A significant number of monetary reformers focus on a money multiplier (and often on fractional reserves). They are still stuck in a loanable funds world, probably because orthodox economics has been so successful in teaching their delusion that we live in a loanable funds world, so these reformers, despite being heterodox in their goals, learn their economics from orthodox sources. Of course, we are not in a loanable funds world, so there is no money multiplier (and here). This means this significant section of monetary reformers is (rightfully) dismissed by those who understand how banking works. 

II. There is another group of monetary reformers that do understand that we are in an endogenous money – not a loanable funds – world. Their proposals do not focus on a (non-existent) money multiplier. Their proposals are aimed at actually making the current endogenous money system into a true loanable funds system. This would be a “no reserves” system. (Positive Money and related proposals are examples of this group).

For the second group above, this leads to a somewhat difficult intellectual position. Post-Keynesian economists have been trying to get orthodox economists to understand the way the economy actually works (with endogenous money) in the real world for decades, and have looked on in dismay as orthodox economists have spent whole careers writing about a non-existent loanable funds system and in turn giving terrible, indeed dangerous, policy advice. Thus it is natural to view holders of the loanable funds view as enemies who do real harm to the economy and the public. But it is different to be frighteningly delusional about reality (as orthodox economists are about loanable funds) than to understand that the current system is an endogenous money system and want to make it a loanable funds system (as PM-type proposals do. There are other main reasons many Post-Keynesians reject PM-type proposals. At times, though, it seems mere association with the muddled orthodox view of banking does influence how/whether some Post-Keynesians really weigh the details of PM-type proposals).

I think several points follow from making the above distinctions into two groups. Primarily they concern the possibility for PM type money reformers to strongly support some key MMT proposals for financial reform, and in turn good reasons for Post-Keynesians to be in dialogue with both types of monetary reformers, rather than seeing them as some misguided offshoot of the loanable funds mainstream.

On the AMI, PM, monetary reform side –

  1. Realize the danger of being thought “not to get” endogenous money (or of actually not getting it for those in group I above). Educate those who still talk about “full/fractional reserves” and a money multiplier that these are just not the issue. Irrelevant terms such as full/100%/fractional reserves immediately suggest that the banking system is simply not understood. The loanable funds system PM and others propose is a “no reserves” system, not a full reserve system. PM type proposals are about changing the endogenous money banking system to a (no reserves) loanable funds system.
  2. Strongly support MMT proposals that get part of the way to your goals, even if you ultimately want further changes. Warren Mosler’s proposals go a significant way towards reducing negative aspects of the current endogenous money system and are in accordance with PM type views; two in particular:

“Banks should only be allowed to lend directly to borrowers and then service and keep those loans on their own balance sheets.”

“Banks should not be allowed to accept financial assets as collateral for loans.” (Mosler)

Both of these would significantly alter and restrict the current endogenous money system in ways that move the system towards PM and similar plans’ goals. Indeed, PM itself lays out what their ultimate goals (brief version here) are and separately shorter-term goals that in part are similar to what many MMT and similar proposals for bank reform want.

Also – some MMT (and other Post-Keynesian) proponents are in favor of nationalizing banks, and/or of creating an additional system of narrow banking for those who want it. PM recognizes this as an important step towards their ultimate goals. Creating postal banks or any other narrow banking system as at least an option for the public is a logical and do-able goal that many sides could unite behind.

In other words, if PM type proposals want to move from “A” (today’s system) eventually to “D” (a loanable funds system), and Mosler-type proposals move the system to “B” (significant restrictions on the way endogenous money is currently created; the existence of a parallel narrow banking system for those who want it) then PM should be very much on board.

For Post-Keyenesians:

  1. Try (even) harder to teach monetary reformers that are erroneously still worried about a money multiplier (group I) that there simply is not one in the current system (I know – it seems they just won’t listen to good advice). If they understood endogenous money and that loans create deposits they would see that reforming a “money multiplier” is a waste of time. This might then lead them to see the logic of and support reform proposals such as Warren Mosler’s. Another possibility is that they would become part of group II above and at least understand the issues more clearly. This would make coherent discussions possible, and take one more group out of the spell of orthodox nonsense.
  2. Regarding group “II” above – Post-Keynesians should recognize that group II monetary reformers are different from orthodox economists in a crucial way – they get endogenous money – they just don’t believe it serves the public purpose. They truly believe that a real loanable funds model is possible to create and serves the public purpose better than the existing system. Recognize that real dialogue is possible with them unlike with the vast majority of orthodox economists. If a loanable funds model would not work or would be worse for the public, clearer statements of why could be made. I know there are essays by Post-Keynesians about some of these proposals; I think they could be better (more on this below). For example, usually one of the more conscientious writers of the MMT economists, Bill Mitchell, compares some of these proposals to the gold standard (although he seems to be considering some of the Austrian type proposals in part of the essay). Mitchell writes “There would be the equivalent of a gold standard imposed on private banking which could invoke harsh deflationary forces.” While under a true loanable funds system such as PM proposes endogenous private credit-money would not be created, it is obviously still a fiat system, and neo-Chartalist and functional finance insights hold: limitless (except by inflation) money could be pumped into the economy as needed through fiscal policy, tax decreases, and citizens dividends. The gold standard comparison simply does not make sense.* Ditto concerns about PM proposals being deflationary (not in the long run for the reasons mentioned, nor in the short run since the changeover would be portfolio neutral – I think the New Chicago Plan has a good explanation of this, page 49 ).

Although PM and similar proposals are not necessarily among the largest or most influential groups (compared to orthodox economists and their policy groups) they do have some visibility and any additional organized, visible support for much needed reforms, and any addition to coherent discussions of our endogenous money system should be welcome.

Rather than arguing among themselves, Post-Keynesians and PM-type groups should focus on the important overlaps of their bank/finance reform proposals. If those are achieved, then the further changes that PM type groups want can be discussed. And despite seeming to have radically different end goals (a fair, stable endogenous system versus a true loanable funds system) the most pressing immediate bank reforms are agreed on by most sides.

Both MMT and PM-type proposals are to use state money for public purpose. The real contention between MMT and PM lies in whether or not endogenous private credit-money creation also serves the public purpose.

The key issues:

Many of the concerns with the PM proposal I have seen brought up are actually discussed in some detail in the PM literature (and/or related points usefully discussed in the new Chicago Plan) and it often seems that critics of the plan simply do not closely read PM explanations of the details of the plan. However, of course there are serious concerns, perhaps the most consistent being:

Would the new system of exclusively state money be able to create a fair system for large business loans? How would that system differ from the current system?

Concerns with the current endogenous money system:

Does the fact that endogenously created private credit-money dwarfs state money restrict the ability of the government to act in the public purpose in the way MMT believes? (possibly through the inflation limitation – can the government really contain inflation while using state money for public purpose when such huge amounts of private credit-money are created?)  Does this render MMT ideas on the role of the state in the economy unworkable? (An example of these worries is Cullen Roche’s criticism of MMT here). 

Does the inherent instability and procyclical nature of endogenous money have too many social costs?

Does the endogenous money system stealthily but inexorably lead to regulatory capture? Relatedly – Does the endogenous money system have a systemic tendency to funnel wealth upwards & into the FIRE sector? Lead to unsustainable levels of private debt? To highly inequitable wealth distributions? [related post]

On these latter questions, Steve Keen’s work seems especially relevant, suggestive of the way in which in the current system of private credit-money seems to ratchet up private debt and credit-money and create crises and inflate the FIRE sector. (e.g., “Are We It Yet?“, “Deleveraging with a Twist” and others; also see important work towards reconciling MMT & Keen’s work).

There are plenty of critiques of MMT – most of which are completely misguided and due to fundamental misunderstandings of the economy due to orthodox economic blinders. I see the most important debate concerning the balance of state and private credit money in a state theory of money and what follows from a state theory of money. These are a few more discussions that touch on that area:

A debate on Endogenous Money and Effective Demand: Keen, Fiebiger, Lavoie and Palley

Modern Money Theory and New Currency Theory  (book length version: Modern Money and Sovereign Currency) (the historical discussion of why MMT and PM-type proposals differ on banking is very enlightening; I disagree with Huber on important aspects of the second part of the paper, especially where he still falls into the household analogy trap, and his unfortunate and confusing use of the term “fractional reserve system” when that is just not the issue. He clearly knows the difference between a no reserves system and “full reserves” although I think there are simpler ways of explaining it).

The Credit Money, State Money, And Endogenous Money Approaches: A Survey And Attempted Integration L. Randall Wray

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[Postscript – A few bits I cut from above for readability]

*On Mitchell’s comparison of creating a loanable funds model to a gold standard – Ralph Musgrave makes similar points concerning Warren Mosler’s light dismissal of Martin Wolf’s article on banking reform. (But please Ralph – quit talking about “Full/Fractional reserve! : ) The PM loanable funds model will be a “no reserves” system!)

PM-type proposals & MMT are in essential agreement that the state can and should just spend state money for public purpose, with inflation the limiting factor. This is sometimes unclear because of the operational peculiarities of various countries, not least of the US. Whether this is just through continued deficit spending, or a 60 trillion dollar coin or similar, circulating treasury notes (the same thing really), or whatever, ultimately makes little difference. PM-type proposals have long used the US Greenback – circulating (mostly digital) treasury notes, as a key example, and MMT economists have the same view.

A final note – sometimes in comments here and elsewhere a criticism is made that “there are more technical papers that do deal with ____, since you don’t have them here you don’t know what you are talking about!” and/or “this post only relies on other blog posts and simple sources, it is not useful/serious/informed! etc.” I do try to read more “official” and/or technical papers when relevant. Two points though – 1) If bits and pieces of answers to some of these points are buried in technical papers somewhere, that doesn’t help anyone too much – cite them specifically (& better yet – summarize them and why precisely they matter) and 2) I think when good economists like Keen, Wray, Fullwiler and Mitchell with technical work write their views in plain English those writings reflect – and quite often best reflect – what their technical work tells them is right.

 

TOWARDS A PURE STATE THEORY OF MONEY

Knapp State Theory of Money cover, 1905[Prologue to this post]

MODERN MONETARY THEORY (MMT) notes correctly that money is a creature of the state, and that important macroeconomic and policy conclusions follow from this understanding, e.g., sovereign states are not revenue constrained and spending is primarily limited by inflation. Taxes give value to state money and maintain its value (i.e., inflation can be controlled through taxes).

One (among many) key policy insight is that a job guarantee is possible. A job guarantee not only achieves what many think should for myriad social reasons be a primary goal of macroeconomics but also further creates a buffer stock (the most useful one of any imaginable given the social reasons just mentioned) that achieves an additional primary macroeconomic policy goal – stability.

However, there is no state that operates under a pure state system of money. Most of what serves as money in most banking systems in the world is privately created credit money.

We can compare the current most common banking system with a pure state system of money:

PURE STATE SYSTEM OF MONEY

 

CURRENT SYSTEM

Money is a creature of law.

Money is a creature of law.

Money is valued because it can be used to extinguish debt to its issuer.

Money is valued because it can be used to extinguish debt to its issuer.

The issuer is the state.

The issuers are the state and private banks.

Taxes move resources into the public sector

Taxes move resources into the public sector.      Loan repayments move resources into the private (often finance) sector

This raises important questions. If the state is not a monopoly issuer of money, do other neo-chartalist/functional finance/MMT insights hold?

A sovereign currency issuer is still not revenue constrained. And it can still spend towards full employment and other public purposes.

One major worry, however, is whether, because the state does not have a monopoly on money creation, it can set prices in the ways MMT argues. Especially, trying to do so while not having a monopoly on money creation may be inflationary even with otherwise appropriate taxation.

So what are the possibilities? Let’s imagine a system where the state truly has a monopoly on money creation. The state creates money and a payment system. There can still be loans and borrowing, but borrowing will be from someone else giving up use of their money, just as if you loaned a friend a tenner from your pocket. The risks and rewards of this can be pooled for large capital projects.

Let’s ignore the sometimes heard first criticism of this: “deflation!”. Imagine moving to this system in a portfolio neutral way, so that essentially all M’s (M2 and beyond) are, through bookkeeping entries, changed to M1 in a one-off system change. (There are also worries that this “creation” of M1 would be inflationary by others; they seem not to understand what “portfolio neutral” means.)

The obvious advantage is that bank runs will be a thing of the past – assuming a few other obvious regulatory moves (on securities and such) and all bad loans will be losses to individual investors, never systemic (this incidentally puts the incentives for loan quality and underwriting in the right places, raising the quality of loans in the first place). If Joe doesn’t pay you back his tenner, you are the only loser and there is no amplification of this loss. Cascading liquidity crises simply are not possible under this system.

THERE ARE THEN TWO RELATED objections – first, that without continued private credit money creation, this new system would still be deflationary. The related objection is that the “dynamic” private credit money system is behind much innovation and growth, and this would be lost.

On the first – this is interesting as it highlights a major question on the purpose and effectiveness of government. If money is a creature of the state, and a sovereign government cannot be insolvent, then it cannot be that a pure state money system will be deflationary because there is not enough money. The state can create as much money as it needs to re-inflate an economy.

The worry, then, must be that somehow the state will not be able to get the money it can endlessly create into the right hands, while somehow the private credit money system does. This highlights the fact that the worries about abolishing private bank credit money creation cannot truly be about the quantity of money or credit but about how and by whom the money and credit needed to keep the economy from deflation is created and spent into the economy.

This gets to much of what is the core concern of a pure state money system by both advocates and detractors alike, although often they are not nearly as clear as they could be about it.

What serves the public purpose more- having only the state create and spend money and credit into the economy, or allowing the private sector to control part of this public utility?

We already saw that one concern is that private credit money may force a tradeoff between public spending and inflation. What are some other potential costs? What is the real value and real cost of funding borrowers’ needs by allowing credit money to be created privately?

Costs

We already mentioned policy space – the current system of substantially privatizing a public utility seems to move many resources into the private finance sphere, arguably reducing the policy space for public purpose (job guarantee, education, health care, etc.).

A major tenet of MMT/Functional Finance is that it is how we utilize real resources now that matters, not deficits, and that we cannot borrow from the future. Money creation through credit likewise does not magically transport future resources to the present, it can only redistribute existing resources. Ceteris paribus (on taxes, policies, and who is utilizing the money) there is X amount of money that can be spent into an economy without inflation. Credit money creation can only redistribute this X amount of money and the real resources it affords (or cause inflation), and it is not clear that the private system does this in an equitable, nor necessarily the most efficient, manner.

Where private money creation is combined with maturity transformation, as in the shadow banking system, money market and many bond funds, there is a distorted yield curve on interest rates. Some, especially Austrians, view this as leading to market inefficiencies in the long run, in addition to being severely unstable. This system allows narrow private benefits at the expense of widespread socialized costs and chronic instability (Maurice Allais’s non-Austrian work on this seldom receives the attention it merits, especially in the English speaking world.)

Instability – allowing credit money has time and again led to intense and highly damaging episodes of instability. Diamond & Dybvig formalized the multiple equilibrium nature of banks runs; there is no stable equilibrium of credit-money creating banks without a lender of last resort. The true costs of instability are seldom weighed as a whole, nor presented in a way the general public can understand. What is the true and total cost to the public of the crises of 1907, 1929, 2008, the many smaller crises such as S & L, the Japanese asset price bubble, LCTM, banking crises in Finland, Sweden, Asia, Russia, Mexico, Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay, and throughout Europe, the dot.com and housing bubbles, the bailouts of AIG, Northern Rock etc.? Is it truly, with proper accounting, worth the growth that some defend the current private system as promoting? On balance, a stable economy without socialized losses may be more dynamic and productive and allocate the real resources of the economy more efficiently than the current system, if judged with proper accounting standards.

This leads to another point: Reality. The government already funds the banking system, both with occasional trillion dollar bailouts and on a daily basis. “Private” systems have shown time and again to be backstopped by governments (e.g., the U.S.and U.K.bailouts). The US government has proven to de facto guarantee the entire U.S. financial system (and the UK government the British system and so on), and lenders know it, much to their advantage (and distortion of the real economy). As someone else has written* “When A guarantees B’s liabilities, B needs to be on A’s balance sheet. This is accounting 101, folks.”

MMT very correctly insists that an economic theory, to be worth considering at all, must at a minimum match real bookkeeping. To meet basic standards of accounting we would have to “[c]onsolidate the entire financial system onto USG’s balance sheet. While we’re at it, merge the Fed, Treasury, Social Security and Medicare into one financial entity. Clean up the whole mess of interlocking quasi-corporations. The US government is one operation. It should have one balance sheet.”* Again,  this is Accounting 101.

 IF IT IS INDEED THOUGHT that the benefits of credit money creation are worth the instability and other costs this system incurs on society, this raises another question:

Can a government duplicate credit money creation while distributing the gains and losses more equitably (i.e., socialized gains as well as socialized losses, instead of the current system that is mostly private gain and socialized loss)?

As we noted, in the current system, in addition to the money that people and businesses already have, they often want more money for productive and socially useful purposes. We further noted that there are two ways to get this money:

1. through other people loaning money that they already have or

2. through private credit money creation.

The first is not problematic, while the second is.

Would it be possible for the state to maintain something like the current system operationally, just making the parts of it that already are backstopped by the state actually state? This raises questions: Could this system be kept apolitical? (this potential political downside has to be weighed against the already existing downside: our private system has already experienced extensive regulatory capture). Could it be kept as competitive as it is now? Would it be as unstable as now with a truly “risk-neutral non-liquidity-constrained economic agent” (that is, the government) behind it?

This system could be thought of in this way:  Individuals and businesses that desire more money for productive purposes than they can get from other money holders are granted the privilege of additional state money created just for them; alongside this special privilege they voluntarily accept an additional tax burden to maintain the value of the money system. Let’s add that (in bold) into the comparison we made above between a pure state theory of money and the current state/private hybrid system:

PURE STATE SYSTEM OF MONEY

 

CURRENT SYSTEM

Money is a creature of law.

Money is a creature of law.

Money is valued because it can be used to extinguish debt to its issuer.

Money is valued because it can be used to extinguish debt to its issuer.

The issuer is the state.

The issuers are the state and private banks.

Taxes move resources into the public sector

Taxes move resources into the public sector.       Loan repayments move resources into the private finance sector

Some businesses or individuals want to borrow money. There are two ways to do so. One is for others to loan their existing money. This may be too restrictive and keep growth at suboptimal levels. The other is for new money to be created. 

 

Some businesses or individuals want to borrow money. There are two ways to do so. One is for others to loan their existing money. This may be too restrictive and keep growth at suboptimal levels. The other is for new money to be created.

The government creates this new money. The individual or business pays an additional tax for this privilege.

 Private banks create this new money. The individual or business pays the bank interest for this privilege.

The “lender of last resort” is the lender of first resort. There are both private and social gains and corresponding private and social losses.

 

Privately created money is inherently unstable without a lender of last resort. The government is the lender of last resort. There are private gains and socialized losses

 As a monopolist over its currency, the state has the power to set prices, including both the interest rate and how the currency exchanges for other goods and services. As a monopolist, the state can fund a job guarantee and other public goods without causing inflation.  In a system with “redundant currencies” (Innes 1914) the state may not be able to achieve macro policy goals and prevent inflation simultaneously
 The system is inherently stable. Stability leads to optimal investment, insurance, and allocation decisions and optimal long-term growth and welfare. Redistribution of private and social gains and losses is minimized.  The system is inherently unstable and uncertain. Chronic instability and uncertainty leads to suboptimal investment, insurance, and allocation decisions and suboptimal long-term growth. The system continuously transfers unearned wealth into the private (often finance) sector, furthering suboptimal economic performance and incentivizing rent-seeking and regulatory capture.

 

Currently, many of the most important neo-chartalist/MMT functional finance insights are not applied in the US, UK, and other countries, and they are clearly desperately needed. However, even if they were applied, the private credit money system would still interfere, possibly greatly, and would still lead to the same type of instability it always and everywhere has. The ongoing “crash” of 2008 seems to be fundamentally and deeply related to issues of private credit money creation, not the equally important issues of state money that MMT has so usefully brought to light. A true state theory of money must address the fundamental instability and inequitable nature of what Innes (1914) called a situation of “redundant currencies”, a system of both state and private money creation, and to be fully consistent, integrate it into its framework completely. It is not enough to “agree with the MCT folks” (or vice versa). The two must be a seamless whole.

~~~

* This wording is by an arch-Austrian good with pithy wording; I am not “Austrian” but on this issue, at least, he has interesting observations.

(Previous post: TOWARDS A PURE STATE THEORY OF MONEY, PROLOGUE: A NOTE ON KNAPP & INNES )

TOWARDS A PURE STATE THEORY OF MONEY, PROLOGUE: A NOTE ON KNAPP & INNES

Neo-chartalists rightly look to Georg Friedrich Knapp and Alfred Mitchell-Innes as brilliant forefathers of a state and credit theory of money. However, Knapp and Innes* of course wrote in a different time and had their hands full with explaining the fallacies of metallism and explaining why money is credit.

Now, however, the problems of metallism and the idea of money as credit, and in turn the functional finance implications, are well understood. Besides the contributions of Knapp and Innes to these areas, what did they think about private credit money creation? There is, given their focus on metallism and other issues of the time, relatively little on private money creation in their work. The past century, as mentioned, has seen the development of more or less a full understanding of the implications of the ideas of Knapp and Innes. However, there have been numerous relatively small crises in the past century (just since the 1980s: Savings & Loan in the US, the Japanese asset price bubble, LCTM, banking crises in Finland, Sweden, Asia, Russia, Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay, and throughout Europe) and two massive economic crises (1929, 2008) that have had much or most of their basis in the private credit money creation realm of the economy. In other words, although a great deal of the suboptimal performance (sustained unemployment, lack of investment in infrastructure, education, and healthcare) has been due to a failure to understand and apply readily implementable state money & functional finance insights, there has also been another major source of economic suffering, resulting from the non-state-money side of the economy. The worldwide private credit money system has caused untold suffering and misery for millions. This side of the equation must be integrated into any functional finance insights that arose from Knapp, Innes, and others (the subject of my next post).

Although the answers to questions about state and private credit money stand or fall on their own merit, it is perhaps useful to note what Knapp and Innes thought about the private credit money side of the financial system.

Knapp does not focus on this area, perhaps in part why subsequent neo-chartalist developments did not either. The most interesting passage in Knapp on the subject may be the following:

  “It is a great favour to the banking world that the State permits the issue of [bank] notes. As is well known, other business men may not issue notes, or private till-warrants. Certainly the State also controls the business by law, for it rightly counts it of public utility. But it is nevertheless remarkable that the profits which are increased by this means, of a magnitude only explainable by the note issue, should flow exclusively to the owners of the capital. The State is giving to the holders of bank shares a means of increasing their profits which it absolutely denies to other businesses.” (Knapp 1924 [1905], 136-137)

It seems somewhat surprising that many (by no means all) of the others who built on Knapp’s work did not focus more on integrating this “remarkable” “great favour” of the state to “the owners of capital” and the social and systemic implications for a state theory of money (again, some have; I think not enough).

ON INNES

Innes, of course, wrote from within the Anglo-American financial milieu, and, it is important to remember, immediately after the creation of the Federal Reserve and under the gold standard.

In his two influential papers (1913, 1914) in The Banking Law Journal he develops the credit theory of money which Wray (Wray, working paper**) and others show is consistent with and reinforces Knapp’s state theory of money. Innes only turns his attention to private credit money at the end of the second paper (1914).

Innes, before considering private credit money, discusses a mechanism for inflation of state money under the gold standard. He then goes on to argue that the system where government money is leveraged by private credit money creation amplifies this inflation significantly, and that this is “by far the most important factor” in inflation. (Innes uses the common yet mistaken “fractional reserve” argument for how this leveraging occurs. Considering how common this mistake is, and that he was writing only 1 year after the creation of the Fed, this is understandable in his case).

In my opinion it is difficult to tell where Innes is laying the blame here (and he warns that he does not fully understand this area of money). He uses the term “redundant currencies” several times (all quotes from Innes are from Innes 1914, p. 166-167), which implies he thinks that this mixed system is somehow flawed. It seems, however, that in one case the “redundant currency” is private money, and in another use, it is state money.

Innes makes clear, (in his notes and several other places) that he views private money creation as a natural state of affairs, although he also seems to see the modern mixing of the two systems as possibly problematic (“in old days…it was easy to draw a sharp distinction between government money and bank money”). He also, however, implies that it is merely the way the system is being used (“ignorance of the principles of sound money”) that may be the problem.

As mentioned, Innes cites “this redundant currency” in a way that it seems he is referring to private credit money in the first use. But in the second use of “redundant currency” he seems to be referring to HPM (state money) – a “redundant currency operates to inflate bank loans in two ways, firstly, by serving as a ‘basis’ of loans” (Innes is assuming a loanable funds system).

At any rate, I do not want to make a claim that Innes was against either state (in favor of some kind of free banking) or private money (in favor of some kind of narrow banking system that would soon be in vogue – e.g., by Soddy, The Chicago Plan, Fisher etc.).

But it is clear that Innes saw the state/private hybrid system, as it was in his time, as deeply problematic and the root of inflation.

“Just as the inflation of government money leads to inflation of bank money, so, no doubt, the inflation of bank money leads to excessive indebtedness of private dealers, as between each other. The stream of debt widens more and more as it flows.

That such a situation must bring about a general decline in the value of money, few will be found to deny. But if we are asked to explain exactly how a general excess of debts and credits produces this result, we must admit that we cannot explain. ” (Innes 1914, 166)

I do not want to misrepresent Innes, so I include the entire passage below, with what I see as some of the more relevant parts in bold. I do want to make clear that I am not making, nor do I think Innes actually meant to make, an anti-Fractional Reserve argument, but rather, had he understood that loans create deposits and reserves are not of much importance, Innes would simply have stated his concerns as being about the relation of private to state money.

“Again in old days the financial straits of the governments were well known to the bankers and merchants, who knew too that every issue of tokens would before long be followed by an arbitrary reduction of their value. Under these circumstances no banker in his senses would take them at their full nominal value, and it was easy to draw a sharp distinction between government money and bank money. To-day, however, we are not aware that there is anything wrong with our currency. On the contrary, we have full confidence in it, and believe our system to be the only sound and perfect one, and there is thus no ground for discriminating against government issues. We are not aware that government money is government debt, and so far from our legislators realizing that the issue of additional money is an increase of an already inflated floating debt, Congress, by the new Federal Reserve Act, proposes to issue a large quantity of fresh obligations, in the belief that so long as they are redeemable in gold coin, there is nothing to fear.

But by far the most important factor in the situation is the law which provides that banks shall keep 15 or 20 or 25 per cent, (as the case may be) of their liabilities in government currency. The effect of this law has been to spread the idea that the banks can properly go on lending to any amount, provided that they keep this legal reserve, and thus the more the currency is inflated, the greater become the obligations of the banks. The, importance of this consideration cannot be too earnestly impressed on the public attention. The law which was presumably intended as a limitation of the lending power of the banks has, through ignorance of the principles of sound money, actually become the main cause of over-lending, the prime factor in the rise of prices. Each new inflation of the government debt induces an excess of banking loans four or five times as great as the government debt created. Millions of dollars worth of this redundant currency are daily used in the payment of bank balances; indeed millions of it are used for no other purpose. They lie in the vaults of the New York Clearing House, and the right to them is transferred by certificates. These certificates “font la navette” as the French say. They go to and fro, backwards and forwards from bank to bank, weaving the air.

The payment of clearing house balances in this way could not occur unless the currency were redundant: It is not really payment at all, it is a purely fictitious operation, the substitution of a debt due by the government for a debt due by a bank. Payment involves complete cancellation of two debts and two credits, and this cancellation is the only legitimate way of paying clearing house debts.

The existence, therefore, of a redundant currency operates to inflate bank loans in two ways, firstly, by serving as a “basis” of loans and secondly by serving as a means of paying clearing house balances. Over ten million dollars have been paid in one day by one bank by a transfer of government money in payment of an adverse clearing house balance inNew York.

Just as the inflation of government money leads to inflation of bank money, so, no doubt, the inflation of bank money leads to excessive indebtedness of private dealers, as between each other. The stream of debt widens more and more as it flows.

That such a situation must bring about a general decline in the value of money, few will be found to deny. But if we are asked to explain exactly how a general excess of debts and credits produces this result, we must admit that we cannot explain. (Innes, 1914, 166-167)

Again, I am not sure on how precisely to interpret Innes’ argument or intentions here. He clearly felt something was wrong with the system but, as he says, he is not entirely sure what. Had Innes lived to see the demise of the gold standard and other developments in the financial sector, one can’t help but wonder what he might have thought about state money, private bank credit money, inflation, and financial instability.

 ~~~

* Although it seems his correct name was Aflred Mitchell-Innes, references to him as both Mitchell-Innes and Mitchell Innes can be found. Innes’ original Banking Law Journal articles did not use a hyphen, and in them, Innes allows himself to be addressed in a letter as “Mr. Innes”, so I will use the shorter of the two.

** L. Randall Wray.  “The Credit money, state money, and endogenous money approaches: A survey and attempted integration.”

Knapp, Georg Friedrich. (1924 [1905]. The State Theory of Money. Clifton: Augustus M. Kelley.

Mitchell-Innes, Alfred (1914), ‘The credit theory of money’,  Banking Law Journal, (Dec/Jan.), 151-68.


(Next post – TOWARDS A PURE STATE THEORY OF MONEY)

 

Question on Steve Keen/MMT Discussion, Total Size of Private Debt|FIRE Sector Bubble

[No claim to originality in this post – just want some opinions on some common views on private debt, MMT, Keen’s work, and the FIRE sector]

Steve Keen argues that private debt was/is an important factor in the “Great Recession” and that aggregate demand equals income plus the change (or rate of change) in debt. (Keen presents a number of interesting GDP to debt, change in debt, employment and other comparisons, here is one example:)


(debtdeflation.com)

This has sometimes led to debates with MMTers (much of which is being resolved already) regarding private credit-money creation netting to zero and related accounting aspects. A crude example:

“This is justified with vague references to “endogenous money”, another Keen shibboleth, with reasoning roughly as follows: Since money is endogenous, the banking system can add to demand by creating money “out of thin air”, without reference to anyone’s income or savings.” (This is here, there is some useful debate however. Also see comments on  Steve’s page)

The debates seem to go a bit like this:

Keen’s statements on private debt.

Someone, usually an MMTer,  pointing out it nets to zero, so doesn’t matter.

Then two counterpoints made- that either 1. the disconnect between Keen and MMT is possibly due to different aspects of dynamic modelling v. accounting, and/or 2. that the fact that private debt nets to zero on the books is hiding inflated asset values (I am not saying these are or are not right here, just running through the points. I will get back to this important conciliation of Keen and MMT in a later post).

Here my question is different.

Regardless of the fact it nets to zero, to what extent is the total size of private debt, and especially its associated asset price increase and FIRE sector size – relative to the economy a problem? This seems to have very negative redistributive effects.

(source)

I know people like Hudson, Bill Black, Mosler, and many others from just about every “school” of thought have done work on this (sometimes with technical terms that can hide its relatedness to this discussion) and criticized the growth or dominance of the FIRE sector (as unproductive, unfair etc).

But somehow I do not see the point being associated to recent online debates concerning Keen’s emphasis on private debt and the MMT emphasis that it nets to zero (but that its total size is much larger than before).

The argument goes something like this:

It is common to see arguments that the larger economy suffers while the wealthy involved in the FIRE sector gain. Saying it nets to zero suggests that it is not so bad for the average Joe either – some win and some lose on mortgages, small business loans, and the many aspects of the financial sector that touch their lives, but it nets to zero.

Some asset price inflation effects are bad – instability is bad for almost everyone. But the point seems not to be made enough that the private debt|FIRE sector bubble is  especially bad for the truly disenfranchised – the lower quintile who, unlike the middle class, have almost no direct exposure at all to the financial sector – they aren’t in the game at all,  just left behind in a world of ever more Starbucks and middle and upper class goods that they have almost no connection to. No mortgages for them, even to lose out on, no business loans, etc. (They would probably love to be in bankruptcy court debating ownership of cars, houses, and credit card debt). Because private debt nets to zero, much of the middle class both loses and gains (at least sometimes) from financialization in complex ways. But at least they are in the game.

It seems those not even in the game of rising (but net zero) private debt just lose.

Again, no claim to originality in any of this. Just wanted to hear more about it in the context of debates on Keen/MMT and private debt netting to zero.

Clint

Private Debt to GDP ratios since 2006

(http://www.incrediblecharts.com/economy/keen_debt_gdp.php)

FIRE SECTOR

(To see clear & interactive graph, go here:  On FIRE: How the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate Sector Drove the Growth of the Political One Percent of the One Percent )

Modern Monetary Theory & Full Reserve Banking: Connected by Fiat

[The fourth of a series of posts on MMT, ‘The Chicago Plan Revisited’, and related issues; see also part 1, part 2, & part 3]

Summary: MMT understands the monetary system in depth, particularly a fiat monetary system. “Full Reservers”, because they have not always fully grasped the significance of the fact there is no money multiplier and that the loanable funds model is wrong, often have a misplaced emphasis on the reserve ratio and sight deposits. Nevertheless, they can be understood ultimately to be worried about endogenous money, and in effect are arguing for a pure fiat money system. Steve Keen shows the magnitude of the negative effects of endogenous money on the economy. If Keen is properly understood, and what are in effect the anti-endogenous money policies of Full Reserve plans implemented, the end point is a pure fiat money system. And the starting point of a true chartalist system, the natural home for neo-chartalism.

There are actually two concerns most advocates of Full Reserves have

1. Solvency – there are few solvency issues with full reserves; not surprisingly a major concern in the 1930s for Simons, Fisher, The Chicago Plan etc.

2. (Endogenous) money creation

The second is much the more important, but the two are often confusingly conflated.
Partly this is because the significance of the fact that the loanable funds model is wrong and there is no money multiplier is not always fully appreciated by Full Reservers.

Banks do not make loans based on reserves or loanable funds but based on demand, perceived profitability, and the capital they hold. The government covers reserve requirements later. Raising reserve requirements can raise costs but does not stop money creation. Even the focus on sight deposits (i.e., PositiveMoney) misses the point – not only do reserve requirements not stop money creation, neither does stopping lending based on sight deposits. Banks loans pull money from the central bank, with the limit being the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets.

So, unless Full Reservers are only worried about bank solvency, which is doubtful, they are really addressing concerns that have their root in endogenous money.

Anti endogenous  money, pro- true chartalism proposals

The main benefits of plans such as AMI, PositiveMoney, Kotlikoff, the Chicago Plan, Werner etc are, or would be with any needed tweaking, that:

Issuing fiat would be rightfully reserved for the issuer of the fiat decree: the government. A monopoly on money (but not on banks; entities that invest people’s money and distribute the gains would exist much the same as now). As L. Randall Wray notes, “money is a social creation. The private credit system leverages state money, which in turn is supported by the state’s ability to impose social obligations mostly in the form of taxes.” (Wray, 35)*. As the system stands, a public good is leveraged for narrow private gain, in a process that entails public costs through intrinsic systemic instability.

Implementing restrictions on the type of lending that leads to endogenous money creation would be “no big deal” according to Warren Mosler. (The details of how this would work, and why credit, investment in capital, and instruments for earning interest would still exist are in the various plans; Mosler suggests they would only be allowed to invest their equity capital. Some details are here).

The effect of this, however, would be a very big deal indeed. It would be the creation of a true fiat system of money, instead of the mixed state-credit financial system (as Steve Keen calls it) we have now. All money would be outside, exogenous, vertical, HPM.

Endogenous money creation is a vestige left over from older systems, where either banks were powerful enough to challenge sovereigns, or rich enough to buy off lawmakers, or where commodities actually were leveraged with bank notes. And before digital accounts, weakening banking regulation and related developments completely untethered credit-money creation from reality.

Whatever the past utility of endogenous money, in the modern economy it serves no socially useful purpose that could not be retained under a true chartalist,  pure fiat money system. Worse, endogenous money is increasingly understood to be extremely socially costly (especially in the work of Steve Keen).

Pro Full Reserve advocates, if the goals of their proposals and root of their worries are reviewed carefully and in light of the fact that loanable fund and money multiplier models are incorrect, are most concerned with the same problems Keen has also so clearly shown, that endogenous money is destabilizing and harmful.

It is evident that (neo)chartalist policies would work better under (true) chartalism than under the mixed state-credit financial system we operate under now.

That is why I say that Modern Monetary Theory & Full Reserve Banking are Connected by Fiat.

_______________
*L. Randall Wray “The Credit Money, State Money, and Endogenous Money Approaches: A Survey and Attempted Integration” Link

Although the simplifying assumptions are not perfect, Endogenous Supply of Fiat Money highlights some incentive problems with bank credit-money creation.

P.S. This post was partly inspired by a perceived lack of interest on the part of MMTers in full reserves, and vice versa (and downright hostility to MMT from the AMI Full Reservers). Good discussion here.

I see MMT, the aims of Full Reservers, and followers of the enlightening work of Steve Keen as natural allies.

Bob Mitchell (MMT), and Ralph Musgrave (pro-Full Reserve), both explicitly disagree, stating that MMT and Full Reserve have little in common. I will consider Bill Mitchell’s objections  in another post. In a nutshell though, Mitchell’s proposals (besides his analysis needlessly wading into the bogs that are Austrian thought) for banking are all very good, needed under any system, and I very much agree with him. However, they are to a large extent trying to undo the damage caused by an inherently flawed pseudo-chartalist system that has all the incentives wrong, a system that creates bank-credit-money bubbles that are the fundamental enablers of much bad activity in the financial sector. You might say that endogenous money adds fuel to the “FIRE” that Mitchell wants to extinguish. Excising endogenous money creation from our fiat money is needed to truly effect the changes Mitchell wants.

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